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1. Introduction 
"A universal adoption of the assumption of monopoly must have very destructive consequences for 
economic theory." (John Hicks (1939, p. 83)).  
 
"…the theory of monopolistic competition has had virtually no impact on the theory of international 
trade." (Harry G. Johnson (1967, p. 203)). 
 
The judgements and predictions expressed in these quotations could hardly have been more wrong. 
The formal model of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition
1
 introduced in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), 
has become a workhorse in several branches in economic theory, including international trade, 
economic growth and macroeconomics. The Dixit-Stiglitz (DS) model has proved useful to a degree 
that has justified the term "The monopolistic competition revolution".
2
 A survey of past and new 
contributions to this revolution is given in Brakman and Heijdra (2003). The following quotation from 
Neary (2000, p.2) is probably representative for the opinion of most economists of today: "The 
widespread adoption of the Dixit-Stiglitz approach to monopolistic competition has had hugely 
positive consequences for many branches of economic theory and especially for international trade 
theory."   
 
Tractability is a major reason for the popularity of the DS model. Tractability is a result of simplifying 
assumptions concerning functional forms, free entry, no perceived interdependence between firms, and 
that firms are identical. The price of simplifying assumptions is that the clear results may be 
misleading except for a narrow range of questions. Montagna (1995) goes a step further when she 
considers the assumption of identical production functions in this model to be inconsistent with the 
interpretation of the Chamberlin's model. Also Stigler (1949) argued that product differentiation is 
unlikely to exist without non-uniform costs. However, all models are "wrong". The good model 
maximises relevant insight to specific problems subject to several constraints, including the trade-off 
between tractability and realism.   
 
This paper moves along the trade-off between realism and tractability with respect to the technology 
assumptions made in the DS model. Rather than assuming that all firms in the industry, both the active 
                                                     
1 See Chamberlin (1933). 
2 Dixit (2000) reports the number of appearances of the phrase "monopolistic competition" in the title and abstracts of articles 
in the database Econ-lit. Appearances in titles increased from less than 20 in the period 1969-1979 to 100 in 1990-1994. 
Whereas the number of appearances in titles fell to 69 in 1995-1999, the total number of appearances in both titles and 
abstracts increased from 176 in 1990-1994 to 211 in 1995-1999. 
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ones and the potential entrants, have identical technologies, the DS model is extended to incorporate 
firm heterogeneity with respect to the productivity of variable inputs. The resulting asymmetric model 
is used to analyse the equilibrium adjustments of aggregate industry variables to changes in exogenous 
variables. Moreover, these results are systematically compared with the corresponding ones obtained 
in the special case of identical firm and symmetric equilibrium. Thus, the robustness of the properties 
of the symmetric DS model is examined with respect to an extension, which clearly improves the 
degree of realism of the model. Empirical studies provide massive evidence of large and persistent 
productivity differentials between firms even within narrowly defined industries, see e.g. Baily, Hulten 
and Campbell (1992), Sutton (1996), Klette (1999) and Klette and Mathiassen (1995, 1996). One of 
the purposes of the paper is to demonstrate that the cost of taking into account some basic 
characteristics of productivity heterogeneity can be relatively low.  
 
A higher degree of realism in a model does not necessarily provide increased insight into interesting 
problems. Is a more realistic description of productivity heterogeneity likely to generate important new 
insights? There are some reasons to think so, even ex ante a formal analysis. The DS model has proved 
particularly convenient in analyses of aggregate industry responses, e.g. in the context of international 
trade. The relationship between aggregate industry behaviour and the behaviour of the individual firms 
was at the heart of the seminal works of e.g. Houthakker (1955-56), Salter (1960), Johansen (1972) 
and Sato (1975)
3
. These works clarified the distinction and correspondence between micro and macro 
production functions, in particular why and how productivity heterogeneity was crucial for the scale- 
and substitution properties of the aggregate production function. For example, both Johansen (1972) 
and Houthakker (1955-56) formalised the old insight that the combination of productivity 
heterogeneity and free entry gives rise to decreasing returns to scale of the industry production 
function. In studies of industry or trade policies, one would intuitively expect that reduced assistance 
to firms, would imply a smaller reduction of industry output when the contraction takes place through 
exit of the least efficient firms, compared to a situation where all firms are assumed to be identical.  
 
In the models used by Johansen and Houthakker, respectively, as well as in the symmetric DS model, 
the output of the individual firms is fixed, i.e. independent of demand side variables. In Johansen 
(1972), Houthakker (1955-56) the output of each active firm is given by an exogenous capacity 
constraint. In the symmetric DS model firm size is fixed by tastes and technology, so that adjustments 
of industry size to changes in demand come about through changes in the number of firms. As will be 
demonstrated in the subsequent analysis, the asymmetric DS model provides a richer story of how the 
                                                     
3 Also in Marshall’s theory of value, as laid out in Frisch (1950), the argument for assuming decreasing returns to scale at the 
aggregate industry level relies on the existence of productivity differentials between firms combined with a selection 
mechanism, which ensures that only profitable firms are active. 
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size of the firm and the industry as a whole is determined, involving mechanisms on both the demand 
and supply side.  
 
Montagna (1995), Leahy and Montagna (1997, 1998), and Molana and Montagna (2000) stand out as 
exceptions from the tradition of assuming identical production functions of the individual firms in the 
DS model. The model framework used in the present paper differs from the one used in these papers 
by imposing another structure on the inter-firm productivity differentials, yielding a return in terms of 
analytical tractability. Another difference lies in the purpose of the papers; the present one performs a 
systematic comparison between the symmetric DS model and the asymmetric DS model resulting 
from a particular structure of productivity heterogeneity, thereby examining how robust the properties 
of the DS-model is with respect to productivity heterogeneity. The paper is related to Holmøy and 
Hægeland (1997, 2000) who explored the determinants of aggregate industry productivity within an 
asymmetric DS model.
4
 The model used in the present paper is less general than the one used in 
Holmøy and Hægeland (1997, 2000) by sticking to the restrictive assumptions in the standard DS-
model, i.e. i) constant returns to scale in variable inputs, and ii) Cobb-Douglas preferences over the 
composite industry good and the aggregate of all other goods. The return is increased transparency of 
the most important mechanisms, and the asymmetric DS model becomes comparable with its 
symmetric counterpart.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the asymmetric DS model and derives 
closed form solutions for aggregate industry variables including output, costs, the price index of the 
differentiated industry product, and the number of active firms. These solutions are compared to the 
corresponding solutions obtained in the standard symmetric version of the model. Section 3 presents 
and interprets aggregate industry responses to changes in exogenous variables including shifts in both 
technology parameters and policy measures. The model makes it possible to compare uniform cost 
shifts in all firms with non-uniform shifts, which may reduce the productivity gaps between firms. 
Where meaningful, the comparative statics results are compared with the analogous results in the 
symmetric version of the model. Section 4 concludes.  
                                                     
4 A more general version of the model analysed in this paper has been calibrated to data for several Norwegian manufacturing 
and service industries and implemented in a large CGE-model of the Norwegian economy. See e.g. Fæhn and Holmøy (2000) 
for an example of an applied trade policy analysis based on this model. 
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2. The model 
The point of departure is the standard DS-model of monopolistic competition between a large group of 
firms. The “differentiated products” industry consists of n firms, each one producing a product being a 
close but imperfect substitute for the products supplied by the other firms in the industry. A 
representative consumer represents the demand side. His preference structure is separable: The n 
different goods enter symmetrically into a linearly homogenous Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz (SDS) utility 
function. The corresponding sub-utility level is a measure of the real consumption of the differentiated 
product, which enters a top level Cobb-Douglas utility function together with a quantity index of all 
other goods. The budget share of the differentiated product will then be constant, and the direct price 
elasticity of the differentiated industry product equals -1. Since the total expenditure is exogenous, 
expenditure spent on the differentiated good will be exogenous in this partial model. This assumption 
is made in order to focus on the changes within the industry, whereas the total industry output will be 
exogenous when measured in units of the other good. Holmøy and Hægeland (1997, 2000) consider a 
more general preference structure.  
 
Equilibrium in each variety market requires 
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where Xi is the output of firm [ ]ni ,0∈ ,  Pi  is the price of the variety produced by the i’th firm, σ > 1 
is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties constituting the differentiated product, Y is the 
exogenous expenses allocated to the differentiated industry product, and P is the ideal price index for 
this product. For analytical convenience the index i, indicating firms and varieties, is treated as a 
continuous variable. The form of the price index P follows from the SDS-preferences: 
  
( )
( )
P P dii
n= ∫
−
−
1
0
1 1
σ
σ
.  (2) 
 
The cost function of firm i is  
 
( )C X c X Fi i i= + ,  
 
where F is a uniform fixed cost and ci is the constant firm specific marginal cost.   
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Firms are ranked according to productivity of the variable input so that firm 0 is the most efficient one. 
We assume a constant relative productivity differential between any two adjacent firms, i.e. 
&c tc c cei i i
ti
= ⇔ = , t>0,  (3) 
 
where -t is proportional to the relative productivity differential between adjacent firms. c c0 = is 
exogenous.
5
 In the special case of homogeneous firms, ci = c as in the standard DS-model.
6
  As in the 
DS-model, n is assumed to be large enough to make the market share of even the largest firm 
insignificant. Thus, each firm is a price index taker in the sense that it neglects the impact of it’s own 
price setting on the price index P. The perceived demand elasticity is equal to -σ, and maximisation of 
(operating) profits then implies the familiar mark-up price setting rule 
 
ii
mcP = ,  (4) 
 
where ( )m = −σ σ 1  is the mark up factor. Maximised operating profits in firm i becomes 
 
( )
iii
Xcm 1−=π .  (5) 
 
In the equilibrium where incentives for firms to enter or exit the industry are eliminated, the following 
condition must hold for the least productive active firm: 
 
π
n
F= .  (6) 
 
Subsequently, firm n will be referred to as the marginal firm. The model (1) - (6) determines the 
endogenous variables Xi, ci, Pi, P, πi, and n.  
                                                     
5 As long as the heterogeneity applies to private cost, the cost differentials may also be interpreted as a result of a particular 
uneven distribution of industry aid from the government. Often uneven subsidisation of firms is used to modify the 
productivity differentials, i.e. to make inefficient firms more profitable. A special case occurs when the subsidisation excactly 
neutralises the productivity differentials, so that the private marginal costs to become equal in all n firms. The equilibrium 
will be symmetric in the sense that all n firms will produce identical quantities and charge the same price. In the case where 
uneven subsidisation overcompensates the productivity differentials, the private variable cost will be a decreasing function of 
the number of the firm, which is based on productivity ranking. Ordering based on ascending private costs will be opposite to 
the ordering based on ascending social costs. In the following this possibility will be disregarded. 
6 The level of c in the symmetric case could differ from c0. For example it could be equal to the average variable unit cost for 
the industry. This would of course affect the solution of the symmetric model. However, as long as c is exogenous, the 
elasticities with respect to exogenous changes would be unaffected. The assumption c = c0 in the symmetric case should 
therefore be regarded as a convenient normalisation. 
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Aggregate output and variable costs are by definition respectively X X dii
n= ∫0  and 
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. The following steps derives closed form solutions for the aggregates P, X and 
C. By inserting (3) and (4) into (2), the price index can be expressed as 
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In the symmetric model of homogeneous firms t = 0, and the price index takes the well known form 
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Inserting (7a) into (1) output from firm i can be written 
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since the term in the square bracket equals output from the most efficient firm. In the symmetric case 
the corresponding solution takes the form 
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The equilibrium solution for n is found by inserting (2), (5), (7a) and (8a) into (6). One then obtains 
the closed form solution for n: 
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In the subsequent derivations of the closed form solutions for the industry aggregates, it is more 
convenient to work with the transform f(n) than with the solution for n. In the symmetric case the 
number of active firms becomes 
 
( ) ⇔=−⇔= FXcmF 1π
σF
Y
n = ,  (9b)
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where the expression for the optimal mark-up factor has been utilised. By using (9a) to eliminate n in 
(7a), the solution for P becomes 
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The corresponding solution in the symmetric reference case becomes 
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Integrating output over the equilibrium number of firms yields the aggregate industry production in the 
asymmetric case 
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By using (9a), the solution for X can be written more compactly as 
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The corresponding solution in the symmetric reference case is 
 
mc
Y
XnX == .  (11b) 
 
Independent of the degree of asymmetry, the aggregate variable costs will always equal 
 
m
Y
diXcC
n
ii
== ∫0 ,  (12) 
 
which equals the total consumer expenditure on the composite industry good evaluated at marginal 
producer costs.  
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3. Comparative statics 
In order to analyse the importance of extending the DS-model by allowing firm heterogeneity with 
respect to the productivity of variable inputs, this section compares how the industry aggregates 
output, input, the price index for the composite industry product and the number of active firms, 
respond in the symmetric and the asymmetric model, respectively, to changes in the exogenous 
technology and demand parameters specified in the model set up in Section 2, i.e. c, t, F, Y and m (or 
σ). The results of the comparative statics analysis are summarised in Table 1, 2 and 3 in terms of 
equilibrium elasticities of the number of active firms, aggregate output and output from the most 
efficient firm, X0. 
Effects on the number of active firms 
In the asymmetric model, the most complex changes in industry aggregates come through changes in 
n. The partial elasticities of n with respect to the relevant exogenous variables, and their order of 
magnitude, are summarised in Table 1 below. It has been utilised that ( ) ( )− < − <1 1 0A Aln , which is 
shown in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 1. Partial equilibrium elasticities of the number of active firms. AS = Asymmetric 
 model, S = Symmetric model 
Model c m Y/F t 
AS 0 
( )
σ+
−
A
A
ln
1
 
( )A
A
ln
1−
 
( )
01
ln
1
1 <−
−
<−
A
A
 
AS   σ - 1 < Elmn < σ 0 < ElY/Fn < 1  -1 < Eltn < 0 
S 0 σ 1 - 
 
A proportional productivity shift in all firms 
c is irrelevant for the equilibrium number of firms, irrespective of the degree of heterogeneity. In both 
model the following logic applies: Due to mark-up pricing, an increase in c implies higher operating 
profits for a given output level. Since all prices of the ex ante available products rise by the same 
proportion, P will increase by the same proportion. The composition of the composite industry good 
will not change. As a consequence of the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences at the upper 
decision level, the direct price elasticity of the composite industry good is equal to -1. Thus, for all 
firms the profit effect of reduced output exactly outweighs the increase in the profit per unit of output, 
and there is no incentive to enter or exit. If the demand for this composite were more elastic, the 
operating profits for the marginal firm would be decreasing in c. Hence, the equilibrium number of 
firms would also be a decreasing function of the product of these variables, see Holmøy and Hægeland 
(1997) for a further discussion.  
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Shift in demand and fixed costs 
It follows directly from (9a) and (9b) that an increase in Y has the same relative effect on n as a 
proportional reduction in F. A partial increase of Y by 1 percent raise the demand function facing all 
firms by 1 percent. An increase in output by 1 percent from each ex ante existing firm would balance 
the product markets, but the profits earned by the marginal firms would exceed the fixed cost. Entry 
occurs until the new marginal firm earns profit equal to the constant fixed cost. (9b) shows that the 
entry/exit condition in the symmetric model determines the uniform output level in all firms 
independent of demand parameters. Thus, increased demand is not met by more output in the existing 
firms, only by output from the new identical firms. Accordingly, n is proportional to Y/F in the 
symmetric model.  
 
In the asymmetric model the expansion of n is under proportionate and equal to ( ) 1ln10 <−< AA  in 
relative terms. The reason why the expansion is smaller than in the symmetric case is that the new 
firms successively will set the price at a higher level than the pre-existing firms, because they become 
increasingly inefficient. Entry will therefore induce some substitution in favour of the existing 
products. Thus, contrary to the symmetric model, the increase in demand is met not only by output 
from new entrants, but also by higher output in the intra-marginal firms. The elasticity of the output 
from the most efficient firm with respect to Y can be shown to equal 0 < 1 - A < 1, see Table 3.  
 
A second effect is caused by the additional utility experienced from an expansion of the product 
spectre. In the model this effect is accounted for by a reduction in the price index, P, which, cet. par., 
raises the demand facing the industry as a whole. Qualitatively, this demand effect works in the same 
way in this asymmetric model as in the symmetric one, but the quantitative impact is smaller in the 
asymmetric case. Cet.par., deviation from a uniform distribution of variety consumption has a 
negative impact on the utility, i.e. a positive impact on P. The increase in Y, combined with entry, 
reinforces the distribution of the industry output in favour of the most efficient firms. The resulting 
positive effect on P modifies the expansion of firms compared to the symmetric model. 
 
Changes in heterogeneity  
Changes in heterogeneity are captured by changes in t. An increase in t raises unit costs in all but the 
most efficient firm. Due to mark-up pricing, substitution in demand will increase the output from the 
most efficient firm, whereas output from the other ex ante existing firms goes down. For a given 
number of firms, X0 increases proportionally to the increase in t, cf. (8a). The ex ante marginal firms 
become less profitable and exit. However, the analytical results reported in Table 1 show that the 
reduction in n is not large enough to prevent a reduction in the product nt, which shows up in the 
exponent in f(n) defined in (9a). If, hypothetically, the equilibrium value of nt were invariant to 
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exogenous changes in the model, the profit condition (6) would imply that also the output of the 
marginal firm would be invariant to changes in t. This is not the case in the asymmetric model. 
Instead, output is higher in all ex post profitable firms. Since profit increases in output, the equilibrium 
elasticity of n with respect to t is greater than -1. 
 
Preferences for variety 
A preference for variety is captured by the elasticity of substitution σ. The lower is σ the less perfect 
can products from different firms replace each other. Thus, the utility obtained from a given degree of 
variety, i.e. by a given number of firms and products in this model, is a negative function of σ. By 
duality, this is captured by P being an increasing function of σ, for given prices of the individual 
varieties. As pointed out above, this model implies a direct link between the optimal mark-up m and 
the preference parameter: m = σ/(σ-1). The elasticity of m with respect to σ is 1-m<0. An increase in σ 
implies a higher perceived price elasticity facing each monopolistic producer. Each firm will therefore 
reduce its price by setting a lower mark-up. In the symmetric model the latter effect is stronger than 
the love-of-variety effect, so there is a negative relationship between P and σ. 
 
A shift in preferences by which variety is more appreciated is captured by a lower σ. In the tables the 
reduction in σ has been dimensioned to 1/(1-m) percent, so that the increase in m equals 1 percent. A 
higher mark-up leads to entry because profit increases for ex ante profitable firms. In the symmetric 
model the elasticity of n with respect to m becomes m/(m-1)=σ, which may be large in the LGMC 
case. The number of entrants is smaller in the asymmetric model than in the symmetric one; the 
elasticity of n with respect to m lies in the interval (σ−1, σ). The modification of this elasticity, caused 
by heterogeneity, is therefore small when σ is large. The main reason for this modification is the same 
as provided in the case of an increase in Y: New entrants charge a higher price than do the existing 
firms. The resulting substitution in favour of existing products implies a negative drag on their 
profitability.   
Aggregate industry output  
Logarithmic differentiation of the closed form expression for aggregate industry output yields the 
equilibrium elasticities reported in Table 2. In the asymmetric model, some of the elasticities depend 
on the variable ( ) ( )∆ ≡ − − −A A mA Am m1 1 , which occurs after logarithmic differentiation of the 
function ( ) ( )1 1− −A Am  entering (11a). In Appendix 2 it is shown that ∆>0, and how the properties 
of this function in A and m can be utilised in order to constrain the orders of magnitude of the 
equilibrium elasticities of X . 
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Table 2. Partial equilibrium elasticities of aggregate industry output. AS = Asymmetric 
 model, S = Symmetric model 
Model m c F Y t 
AS  -2+∆(1-A)-A
m
ln(A
m
)/(1-A
m
) -1 ∆(1-A) 1+∆(Α-1) ∆(A-1) 
AS -2 < -2+A < ElmX < -1  0 < ElFX < A < 1 0 < 1−Α < ElYX < 1 -1 < -A < Elt < 0 
S -1 -1 0 1 - 
 
A proportional productivity shift in all firms 
Mark-up pricing implies that an increase in c by 1 percent is shifted forward to a 1 percent increase in 
the prices of all existing varieties and P. Thus, there is no substitution within the industry. As noted 
above, the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences implies no entry or exit, and the demand for the 
composite industry good, as well as each variety, falls by 1 percent. These mechanisms apply to the 
symmetric as well as to the asymmetric model. Measured in relative terms, the impact of c on X is 
independent of the degree of heterogeneity.  
 
Shift in demand 
In the symmetric model X is proportional to Y, cf. (11b). Given the assumptions above, the expansion 
of the industry output caused by an increase in Y is brought about by entry, whereas the size of the 
representative firm is constant.  
 
In the asymmetric model, however, each firm producing ex ante will increase its output. From the 
derivations in appendix 2 it follows that the equilibrium elasticity of X with respect to Y, ElYX, 
becomes smaller when firms become different with respect to productivity, cf. Table 2. There are three 
reasons why ElYX is smaller in the asymmetric than in the symmetric model: First, the number of 
entrants is smaller since their productivity is successively decreasing. Second, the output from the new 
entrants is successively decreasing from the level produced by the ex ante marginal firm. Third, the 
spread of the budget shares increases as successively less efficient and smaller firms enter the industry. 
Since preferences are symmetric, this implies a negative modification of the increase in P caused by 
an extended product spectre. Consequently, the decrease in P is smaller than in the symmetric case, 
which implies a negative modification of aggregate demand. 
 
Shift in fixed costs 
An increase in the fixed cost affects X only through a reduction in the number of firms. Irrespective of 
the degree of symmetry F affects X through the term Y/F. Thus, in relative terms the change in X from 
an increase in F is symmetric to the effects working through entry, when Y increases. The logic in the 
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preceding paragraph therefore applies when the equilibrium elasticity ElFX is to be explained. In the 
symmetric model this elasticity equals -1.  
 
The absolute value of ElFX is smaller in the asymmetric model because the number of exiting firms is 
smaller, because the exiting firms represent relatively small output shares, and because exit reduces 
the spread in the budget shares. The latter effect implies that the increase in P, due to a more limited 
product spectre, is modified downwards compared to the symmetric model. Consequently, the decline 
in the degree of heterogeneity contributes to raise aggregate demand (Y/P).  
 
Changes in heterogeneity  
In relative terms t and F are shown to have a symmetric effect on X. This result is perhaps not 
intuitively obvious since increases in t and F are associated with costs and entry barriers. Let us 
decompose the impact of t on X into effects on output from the most efficient firm, X0, the other ex 
ante profitable firms and the output from firms that exit.  
 
A rise in t raises marginal costs in all but the most efficient firm. Consequently, prices of all but the 
cheapest variety (number 0) are set higher. The resulting increase in P implies a reduction of the 
demand for the differentiated product. In addition, it brings about substitution of demand in favour of 
the most efficient firm. Since σ>1, this substitution effect dominates the equilibrium adjustment of X0, 
cf. Table 3. However, the substitution within the industry implies that the ratios 
0
XX
i
 fall for 
ni ≤<0 , which, cet. par, contributes to reduce X. From the derivation of (11a) X may be written as 
∫=
n i
di
X
X
XX
0
0
0
, where 
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1
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( )
t
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X
X
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n i
σ
−
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0
0
. Neglecting for a moment that A 
depends on t directly and indirectly through n, it follows that the impacts of t on X0 and on ∫
n
i
diXX
0 0
 
cancel out. Note that when tn is large (due to small fixed costs and/or a high degree of heterogeneity), 
A becomes small as σ is large. Intuitively, this means that the marginal firm has a small share of 
output, X, and the budget Y. More precisely: In the limit the error made by integrating over an infinite 
number of firms and products rather than an increasing number of firms and products vanishes. This 
limit corresponds to A = 0, which would reflect F = 0, i.e. no entry barrier. In this case neither P nor X 
is affected by a small variation in the number of (infinitesimal) firms. 
 
Thus, marginal changes in t will not have significant effects on X if the ex ante marginal firm is 
"small". When this is not the case, the following effects cause a decline in X: The ex ante marginal 
firm(s) will not be profitable after a rise in t, because the price sensitivity of the demand for each 
product prevents the firm from regaining the profits lost by the increase in their variable unit costs. 
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The exit of firms is necessary until the ex post marginal firm earns a profit equal to F. Cet. par exit of 
course reduces X. On the other hand, exit implies a less diverse product spectre, which shows up as a 
negative utility effect through a further increase in P. Higher P induces a negative shift in the demand 
for the composite industry good, and a further substitution in favour of the ex post profitable firms, 
consistent with the exit. The latter effect dominates; logarithmic differentiation of (8a), contingent on 
n, verifies that the elasticity of Xi with respect to n is negative
7
. On balance, however the direct 
negative effect on aggregate output from the exit of firms is stronger than the effect of increased 
output from the ex post profitable firms. This explains why X falls as an equilibrium response to an 
increase in t. The fact that the negative elasticity is bounded to be greater than -1 reflects the 
aforementioned limited impact entry or exit can have on X.  
 
Preferences for variety 
In the symmetric model mcYX = , cf. (11b). From ( )1−= σσm , it follows that the elasticity of X 
with respect to σ equals m - 1 > 0 in the symmetric case. Thus, X is a negative function of love of 
variety. Recall that in Table 2 the negative shift in σ is dimensioned to raise m by 1 percent. This 
simple relationship covers the fact that several effects are at work when σ changes, because both the 
strength of the love of variety and the optimal mark-up are affected by σ. Firstly, a 1 percent reduction 
of σ implies an increase in the optimal mark-up and a 1 percent increase in n. Secondly, the output of 
each firm falls, and the equilibrium effect equals -m percent. The equilibrium elasticity of X with 
respect to σ is therefore m - 1, which corresponds to the elasticity of X with respect to m being –1.  
 
The equilibrium reduction of -m percent of the output of each firm can be decomposed into the change 
in the utility of the composite industry good, given by the indirect utility function Y/P, and the output 
of each product per unit of utility. The latter fraction equals ( ) mnPmc −− =σ  in equilibrium. A fall in 
σ lowers P for given values of m and n, reflecting the positive utility effect of stronger love of variety. 
On the other hand, the rise in the optimal m raises all product prices reducing the utility level, and Y/P 
is also reduced as n shrinks. In relative terms the net effect on Y/P of a 1 percent fall in σ is an increase 
equal to ( ) nmm ln1− percent. The relative change in the equilibrium fraction mn−  is equal to 
( )[ ]1ln1 +−− nmm  when σ falls by 1 percent. Adding these two contributions gives the -m percent 
reduction of the equilibrium output from each firm.
8
  
 
                                                     
7 The elasticity of Xi with respect to n equals (1-σ)tnA/(1-A) < 0. 
8 This result can be derived more directly from the non-profit condition, which can be written ( )[ ]cmFX 1−= . However, 
this is a reduced form solution for X , which does not shed light on the different mechanisms producing it. 
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The fact that X turns out to be independent of n in the symmetric model reflects that the additional 
output from entrants is exactly offset by a contraction of output in the ex ante profitable firms. This is 
why n does not enter (11b). The net effect turns out to be identical to what happens in the much 
simpler case where Y is spent on one homogenous good with a price equal to mc. This property is a 
consequence of assuming the demand elasticity of the composite industry good to be -1.  
 
In the asymmetric model, things are bit more complex. However, as pointed out above, if the ex ante 
marginal firm is small, a good approximation of the effects on X can be given by neglecting effects 
working through entry. Note that for a given number of firms, the marginal firm will be smaller in the 
asymmetric case than in the symmetric case. It follows from (11a) that approximations to the 
equilibrium responses in X can be found from the expression cmYX
2
'= , where X' denotes the 
approximate solution for X in the case where the relevant integrals calculated for an infinite number of 
firms/products. Recall that in the symmetric model mcYX = , so mXX =' . Thus, when m is close 
to unity, the total industry output will only be slightly smaller in the asymmetric case than in the 
symmetric one. However, whereas the elasticity of X with respect to m is -1 in the symmetric model, it 
will be close to -2 in the asymmetric model when the marginal firm is of negligible size.  
 
The relative change in X to a 1 percent fall in σ by 1 percent can be decomposed into the change in 
output from the most efficient firm, X0, and the change in the ratio between the aggregate output from 
the other firms and X0. From (8a) 
( )
( )( )




−
−
=
− tn
emc
Yt
X
σ
σ
10
1
1
 and the latter ratio equals 
( )( )tn
n
ti
etdieXX
σσ
σ
−−
−== ∫ 1100 . Neglecting the effects associated with changes in 
tn
e
σ−
 and 
( )tn
e
σ−1
, a 1 percent fall in σ raises X0 by 2m-1 percent, whereas X/X0 decreases by 1 percent. Thus the 
approximate elasticity of X with respect to σ equals 2(m-1), which is equivalent to an elasticity of X 
with respect to m equal to –2. The ratio X/X0 corresponds to n in the symmetric model. Note that σ 
enters the solution for n in the symmetric model in exactly the same way as it enters the approximate 
solution for X/X0 in the asymmetric model. Comparing X0 in the asymmetric model with 
( ) cFX 1−= σ  in the symmetric model, shows that (σ-1) enters both numerators. However, σ also 
enters the denominator in X0 through m. Thus, a fall in σ has an additional negative impact on X0 
compared to X . The intuitive reason for the difference is that a change in σ has a direct impact on the 
composition of aggregate output and expenditure when the product prices differ initially; a lower value 
of σ will cause a redirection away from the most efficient firm. 
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The modifications brought about by entry are captured by the fraction ( ) ( )1 1− −A Am in the 
asymmetric model. It turns out that the increase in n, together with the fall in σ implies a less negative 
elasticity of X with respect to m. The reason is that the additional output from the entrants is positive. 
This effect dominates the negative effect caused by the fact that an increase in n reduces P, which cet. 
par reduces output from the ex ante profitable firms. 
 
Table 3. Partial equilibrium elasticities of output from the most efficient firm. AS = 
 Asymmetric model, S = Symmetric model 
 m c F Y t 
AS -(1-A+σ) -1 A 1-A 1 - A 
S -σ -1 1 0 - 
 
Aggregate productivity of variable inputs 
Since factor prices are exogenous in this model, the productivity of variable inputs may be measured 
by the unit cost, i.e. C
C
X
≡ . In the symmetric model the productivity of variable inputs is by 
definition equal to c. When firms differ with respect to productivity, industry expansion through entry 
of successively less efficient firms implies decreasing returns to scale and a reduced productivity of 
variable input at the industry level. The following analysis shows, however, that the productivity effect 
caused by entry/exit is surprisingly limited in the present model. The mechanism producing this result 
is likely to be quite general as long as a) demand plays a role in the output determination, and b) firms 
set the product price as a mark-up over marginal costs. Combining (11a) and (12), C  can be 
expressed in terms of exogenous variables by  
  






−
−
=
m
A
A
mcC
1
1
. (13) 
 
The impact on C  from entry/exit works through A, where 0 < A < 1. The function  
h(A) = (1 - A)/(1 - A
m
) is strictly decreasing in A from its asymptotic value h(0) = 1, see appendix 2. It 
converges towards 1/m as A approaches unity. From (9a) it is clear that the limit A = 1 represents the 
situation where the fixed cost is infinitely large compared to sales, so no firm can survive. A = 0 
corresponds to the opposite limit case where no fixed cost restricts entry and n is infinitely large. More 
precisely, entry can only change C within the interval 
 
 18
mcCc << . (14) 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 1. m will be relatively close to unity when σ is large, which is typically the 
case when the assumption of monopolistic competition is appropriate. It follows that all the exogenous 
variables that affect C through entry, i.e. through changes in A only, have a limited impact on C . The 
intuition behind this result is that the weights (output share) of successively less productive entrants in 
the aggregate industry productivity measure decline at a rate that dominates the rate of increase in 
variable unit cost. Holmøy and Hægeland (2000) provides a detailed and more general analysis of the 
determinants of C . 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between aggregate productivity (unit cost) and the number of firms 
Number of firms
n*
Aggregate unit cost
c0
mc0
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4. Concluding remarks 
The paper has analysed aggregate industry behaviour within an asymmetric DS-model of monopolistic 
competition, in which firms differ with respect to the productivity of variable inputs. Although the 
formal description of productivity heterogeneity is stylised, the model represents a generalisation of 
the standard symmetric DS-model, which captures important aspects of reality. The paper 
demonstrates that more realism is gained at a relatively low cost in terms of reduced analytical 
tractability. The menu of mechanisms that contribute to determine the equilibrium solutions becomes 
richer, but closed form solutions can still be derived. By comparative statics the properties of the 
asymmetric DS-model are compared systematically with the corresponding symmetric model. The 
robustness of the latter is examined with respect to productivity heterogeneity. The partial equilibrium 
elasticities in the symmetric case become a better approximation to the corresponding elasticities of 
the asymmetric model, the greater is the number of active firms and the greater is the productivity 
differentials between firms. On the other hand, the modifications of the marginal properties of the 
symmetric DS- model become more important the greater is the market share of the marginal firm. 
Whereas the firm size is invariant to changes in most exogenous variables in the symmetric DS-model, 
this is not the case in the asymmetric model. Here, expansion of industry output, caused by changes in 
exogenous variables, will typically take place through both entry and expansion of the ex ante existing 
firms when productivity differ among firms. The endogenous aggregate industry relationship between 
output and variable input is characterised by decreasing returns to scale. However, the scope for 
variation in the aggregate industry productivity of variable input is rather limited. 
 
The usefulness of taking firm heterogeneity into account in analyses of questions related to aggregate 
industry adjustments will be determined through applied and - hopefully - increasingly empirical 
work. Evidence showing that heterogeneity may play a significant role in the determination of 
aggregates is rapidly increasing in several fields of economics. The possibilities for providing realistic 
descriptions of heterogeneity have exploded over the last decade as micro data have become much 
more easily accessible. Describing and explaining heterogeneity within industries has become a well-
established branch in the economics literature. These trends contribute to reduce the cost-benefit ratio 
of general equilibrium analyses of aggregate industry behaviour, in which representative agents are 
replaced parametric distributions. The present paper provides one example of how this can be done. 
Future research will hopefully be able to find parametric distributions that are better compromises 
between tractability and realism, than both the distribution assumed in this paper and the one assumed 
in Montagna (1995). Fæhn and Holmøy (2000) applies a large scale CGE-model where the industry 
behaviour is determined in a sub-model that is somewhat more general than the model analysed above.  
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A more limited extension of the work presented in this paper would be to introduce heterogeneous 
assistance to firms as well as productivity heterogeneity. In several cases governments helps the least 
efficient firms through various kinds of industry policies. Such a differential policy is likely to 
increase the market share of the least productive firms as well as the number of firms. The welfare 
effects of such policies may be large, and a tractable model of firm heterogeneity is needed to assess 
them.  
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Appendix 1 
In this appendix it is shown that  
 
( ) 0ln11 <−<− AA .  (A.1) 
 
Recall from (14) that 0 < A < 1, which implies that lnA < 0. Hence the second part of the inequality in 
(A.1) is trivially fullfilled. In order show the first inequality, lnA is written as the Taylor series: 
 
...
32
ln
32
−+−=
yy
yA  , (A.2) 
 
where 0 > y = 1 - A > -1. It can now be shown that 
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1
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A
A
, (A.3) 
 
which implies (A.1). Inserting (A.2) into the left hand side of (A.3) yields 
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because 
1
1
0
i
y
i
−
+
> when i is a positive integer and 0 > y > -1. This proves (A.1). 
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Appendix 2 
The closed form solution for aggregate industry output, X, is proportional to the term 
( ) ( )T A Am≡ − −1 1  where 0<A<1. In order to find the partial elasticities of X with respect to the 
exogenous variables, one needs the logarithmic differential of T. A routine calculation yields 
 
( ) ( )$ $ $ , $ , $T
A
A
mA
A
A
mA A
A
m A m A g A m m
m
m
m
m
=
−
−
−





 −
−
≡ −
1 1 1
ln
∆ , 
 
where $T dT T=  a.s.o. In order to determine the sign and the order of magnitude of the partial 
elasticities of X, it is necessary to determine the sign of ∆ and the characteristics of g(A,m). 
 
The sign of ∆ can be determined by examination of the function 
 
( )f A h
hA
A
h
h
, =
−1
 
 
because ∆ can then be written 
 
( ) ( )∆ = −f A f A m, ,1 . 
 
Thus, if f is a monotonous function of h in the interval [1,m], the sign of ∆ is determined. The 
derivative of ∆ with respect to h becomes 
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( )
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−
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where 0 1≤ ≡ ≤a Ah . Making a Taylor expansion of lna from a = 1, lna can be written as  
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which implies that  
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since each term in the sum is positive. This proves that ( )′ <f A hh , 0  globally, which implies that ∆ ≥ 0  
and increasing from ∆(A,1) = 0. However, ∆ converges asymptotically towards the 
limit ( ) ( )∆ A A A,∞ = −1 . This limit can be found by calculating 
 
( ) 0
ln
lim
1
lim,lim =−=
∞
∞
=
−
=
∞→
−
∞→∞→ A
A
A
h
hAf
h
h
h
hh
, 
 
where L’Hopitals rule has been employed once. Consequently, ( )AA −<∆≤ 10 .   
 
Now, turn to the function g(A,m). In order to determine which values this function spans, it is 
convenient to write it as a function of a: 
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G(a) is monotically decreasing since 
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in the interval 0 1≤ ≤a . To find the interval for the values of G, first note that employing L’Hopitals 
rule implies that  
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This implies that 
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Moreover, by L'Hopital's rule, 
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Hence, the function g(A,m) varies decreases from 0 to -1 as a increases from 0 to 1.  
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